Strategic Union Delegation and Incentives for Mergers by Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent
Strategic Union Delegation and Incentives for Merger
∗
Ana Mauleon
1
and Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
2
1
FNRS and CEREC, Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis, Brussels, Belgium
2
FNRS and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
November 2004
Abstract. We consider a unionized duopoly model to analyze how unions affect the in-
centives for merger. We find that both firms will merge if and only if unions are weak.
However, once surplus-maximizing unions have the option to delegate the wage bargain-
ing to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members), both firms may have
incentives to merge even if the union bargaining power is strong. Moreover, the option of
strategic delegation may harm both the unions and the firms.
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1 Introduction
Labour market organization plays an important role in determining wage levels and prod-
uct market structure (see e.g. Horn and Wolinsky, 1988). In this note we incorporate
the option for unions to delegate the wage bargaining and we analyze how it affects the
incentives for merger.
Up to now the literature has mainly focused on strategic delegation on behalf of share-
holders. Fershtman and Judd (1987) have addressed the issue of strategic managerial
delegation in the context of oligopolistic industries with Cournot competition (see also
Sklivas, 1987). More recently, González-Maestre and López-Cuñat (2001) have considered
the interactions between the use of strategic managerial delegation and mergers. They
have shown that the incentives for merger, under managerial delegation, are considerably
increased with respect to the setting without delegation. Regarding strategic union dele-
gation, Jones (1989) has shown that a divergence between the objectives of union leaders
and union members will naturally arise in a democratic union as part of a rational bargain-
ing strategy. Essentially, the reason is that in many bargaining situations, commitment
can be valuable, and the union members can credibly commit to a bargaining stance,
which they could not otherwise sustain, by delegating authority to a negotiator whose
objectives make this stance an optimal one. More recently, Conlin and Furusawa (2000)
have provided an explanation of why senior union members may represent the union in
contract negotiations with a monopolist. By strategically delegating contract negotiations
to wage-maximizing individuals, the surplus-maximizing union may be better off than if
surplus-maximizing individuals negotiate the contract.
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In this note we go further by dealing with the interactions between the strategic use
of union delegation and the incentives for merger in duopolistic markets. In what follows
we show that unionization does not always reduce the incentives for merger as advocated
in Horn and Wolinsky (1988). Indeed, we find that, once the surplus-maximizing union
has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to wage-maximizing delegates, both firms
may have incentives to merge even if the union bargaining power is strong. Precisely,
both firms may find profitable to merge and negotiate the wage with surplus-maximizing
delegates in order to avoid having to bargain with wage-maximizing delegates. Moreover,
we show that in such equilibrium the option of strategic delegation harms both the unions
1
Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) have developed a model of wage determination with private in-
formation, in which the union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining. They have found that
the maximum delay in reaching an agreement (or maximum strike activity) is greater whenever the union
chooses wage-maximizing delegates instead of surplus-maximizing delegates and remains finite even when
the length of the bargaining period shrinks to zero.
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and the firms.
An important consequence of those findings is that one should question the wisdom that
unionization decreases incentives for merger and that strategic union delegation increases
benefits for the union.
2 The model
Consider a duopolistic market for a single homogenous product, where the demand is
linear and is given by P = a−b ·Q, P is the market price, and Q is the aggregate quantity
demanded. There are two firms indexed by i, i = 1, 2. Let Q
i
denote the quantity
produced by firm i, and let Π
i
denote the profit level of each firm i. The only variable
input is labour. Technology exhibits constant returns to scale and is normalized in such a
way that Q
i
= L
i
, where L
i
is labour input, and the unit production cost of each firm is
the wage W
i
. Thus, the profit of each firm is given by
Π
i
= (a− bQ)Q
i
−W
i
·Q
i
.
Each firm belongs to and is controlled by one risk-neutral owner. The objective of each
owner is to maximize profits. In addition, each firm is unionized, and enters into a closed-
shop agreement with its risk-neutral union. The workforce for each firm is drawn from
separate pools of labour, and the union objective is to maximize the union surplus, taking
as given the wage obtained by the other union :
U
i
= L
i
· (W
i
−W ),
where W is the reservation wage.
We study a four-stage game. In stage one, the owners of the firms decide whether or not
to merge both firms.
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In stage two, the surplus-maximizing union (of each firm simulta-
neously) chooses whether to use surplus-maximizing delegates or to use wage-maximizing
delegates (such as senior union members) who will negotiate the wage with the employer.
The objective of a wage-maximizing delegate is simply V
i
=W
i
−W . In stage three, the
wage bargaining occurs. Finally, in stage four the employer chooses the output level. The
model is solved backwards.
In the last stage of the game, two cases have to be distinguished. First, we consider the
case in which the firms have not merged, i.e. the duopoly case. Then, knowing that the
2
To keep the model as simple as possible it is assumed that once both firms merge both unions merge
too. This can be derived endogenously by allowing both unions to choose whether or not to merge once
both firms have already merged. Another interpretation is that a merger implies the concentration of all
activities in a single plant.
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wage levels (W
1
and W
2
) have already been determined, the employers of the two firms
compete by choosing simultaneously their outputs to maximize their profits. The Nash
equilibrium of this stage game yields :
Q
1D
(W
1
,W
2
) =
a+W
2
− 2W
1
3b
, Q
2D
(W
1
,W
2
) =
a+W
1
− 2W
2
3b
,
P
D
(W
1
,W
2
) =
a+W
1
+W
2
3
,
where the subscript "D" identifies the duopoly. Second, we consider the case in which
the firms have merged to form a monopoly. Then, knowing that the wage level (W ) has
already been determined, the monopolist chooses :
Q
M
(W ) =
a−W
2b
, P
M
(W ) =
a+W
2
,
where the subscript "M" identifies the monopoly.
3 Duopoly
In the third stage wage bargaining occurs. Inside each firm the employer and the union
delegate negotiate the wage level foreseeing perfectly the effect of wages on output and
employment levels. The two negotiations take place simultaneously and independently.
That is, when negotiating the wage, the employer and the union delegate take the other
firm’s wage as given. We model the outcomes of the bargaining by using the formula of
an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution which is interpreted as the limit of the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model when the lag between offers
converges to zero (see Binmore et al., 1986).
First, we consider the case in which in both firms the union sends surplus-maximizing
delegates whose interest is the same as the union’s objective. Then, the predicted wages
are given by
{
W
1
= argmax[L
1
(W
1
,W
2
) · (W
1
−W )]
γ
· [(P −W
1
) ·Q
1
(W
1
,W
2
)]
1−γ
W
2
= argmax[L
2
(W
1
,W
2
) · (W
2
−W )]
γ
· [(P −W
2
) ·Q
2
(W
1
,W
2
)]
1−γ
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the union bargaining power and the disagreement points of both firms
and unions are zero. Solving these simultaneously yields the following solution for wages,
outputs, profits and unions payoffs:
W
ss
1D
= W
ss
2D
=W +
γ
4− γ
(a −W ), Q
ss
1D
= Q
ss
2D
=
2(2− γ)(a−W )
3b(4− γ)
,
Π
ss
1D
= Π
ss
2D
=
1
9b
[
2(2− γ)(a−W )
(4− γ)
]
2
, U
ss
1D
= U
ss
2D
=
2γ(2− γ)(a−W )
2
3b(4− γ)
2
,
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where the superscript "ss" means that union 1 chooses surplus-maximizing delegates and
union 2 chooses surplus-maximizing delegates.
Second, we consider the case in which in both firms the union sends wage-maximizing
delegates. Then, the predicted wages are given by
{
W
1
= argmax[(W
1
−W )]
γ
· [(P −W
1
) ·Q
1
(W
1
,W
2
)]
1−γ
W
2
= argmax[(W
2
−W )]
γ
· [(P −W
2
) ·Q
2
(W
1
,W
2
)]
1−γ
Solving these simultaneously yields the following solution for wages, outputs, profits and
unions payoffs:
W
ww
1D
= W
ww
2D
=W +
γ
4− 3γ
(a−W ), Q
ww
1D
= Q
ww
2D
=
4(1− γ)(a−W )
3b(4− 3γ)
,
Π
ww
1D
= Π
ww
2D
=
1
9b
[
4(1− γ)(a−W )
(4− 3γ)
]
2
, U
ww
1D
= U
ww
2D
=
4γ(1− γ)(a−W )
2
3b(4− 3γ)
2
,
where the superscript "ww" means that union 1 chooses wage-maximizing delegates and
union 2 chooses wage-maximizing delegates.
Finally, we consider the asymmetric cases in which the union of firm i chooses wage-
maximizing delegates and the union of firm j chooses surplus-maximizing delegates. Then,
the predicted wages are given by
{
W
i
= argmax[(W
i
−W )]
γ
· [(P −W
i
) ·Q
i
(W
i
,W
j
)]
1−γ
W
j
= argmax[L
j
(W
i
,W
j
) · (W
j
−W )]
γ
· [(P −W
j
) ·Q
j
(W
i
,W
j
)]
1−γ
Solving these simultaneously yields the following solution for wages and unions payoffs:
W
ws
1D
=W
sw
2D
=W +
γ(4 + γ)
8(2− γ)− γ
2
(a−W ), W
ws
2D
=W
sw
1D
=W +
γ(4− γ)
8(2− γ)− γ
2
(a−W ),
U
ws
1D
= U
sw
2D
=
γ(4 + γ)(16− 12γ − 4γ
2
)(a−W )
2
3b [8(2− γ)− γ
2
]
2
,
U
ws
2D
= U
sw
1D
=
γ(4− γ)(16− 12γ + 2γ
2
)(a−W )
2
3b [8(2− γ)− γ
2
]
2
,
where the superscript "ws" ("sw") means that union 1 (2) chooses wage-maximizing del-
egates and union 2 (1) chooses surplus-maximizing delegates. Comparing the equilibrium
wage expressions confirms our expectations. Wage-maximizing delegates obtain higher
wage levels than surplus-maximizing delegates do : W
ww
1D
> W
ws
1D
> W
sw
1D
> W
ss
1D
and
W
ww
2D
> W
sw
2D
> W
ws
2D
> W
ss
2D
.
In the second stage, the unions simultaneously choose between surplus-maximizing
delegates or wage-maximizing delegates to negotiate the wage with the employer. The
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profile in which both unions choose surplus-maximizing delegates is a Nash equilibrium
of the stage game if and only if U
ss
1D
≥ U
ws
1D
and U
ss
2D
≥ U
sw
2D
. Hence, there is a γ
such that the profile in which both unions choose surplus-maximizing delegates is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if γ ≥ γ  .79. The profile in which both unions choose wage-
maximizing delegates is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game if and only if U
ww
1D
≥ U
sw
1D
and U
ww
2D
≥ U
ws
2D
. Hence, there is a γ
D
such that the profile in which both unions choose
wage-maximizing delegates is a Nash equilibrium if and only if γ ≤ γ
D
 .81.
Two remarks have to be made. First, an asymmetric profile where one union chooses
a surplus-maximizing delegate and the other union chooses a wage-maximizing delegate is
never a Nash equilibrium. Second, for γ ∈ [γ, γ
D
] we have two Nash equilibria but only
one seems to be a reasonable outcome. Indeed, one can easily show that the outcome
where both unions send wage-maximizing delegates is the unique coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium outcome (because of U
ww
iD
≥ U
ss
iD
, i = 1, 2). A Nash equilibrium strategy
profile is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium if no coalition of players could form a self-
enforcing agreement to deviate from it. To summarize, the union in each firm will choose
a wage-maximizing delegate if and only if the union bargaining power is not too strong,
γ ≤ γ
D
.
4 Monopoly
In case the union sends surplus-maximizing delegates, the predicted wage is given by
W = argmax[L(W ) · (W −W )]
γ
· [(P −W ) ·Q(W )]
1−γ
,
which yields :
W
s
M
= W +
γ
2
(a−W ), Q
s
M
=
(2− γ)(a−W )
4b
,
Π
s
M
=
1
4b
[
(2− γ)(a−W )
2
]
2
, U
s
M
=
γ(2− γ)(a−W )
2
8b
,
where the superscript "s" means that the union sends surplus-maximizing delegates to
negotiate with the monopolist.
In case the union sends wage-maximizing delegates, the predicted wage is given by
W = argmax[(W −W )]
γ
· [(P −W ) ·Q(W )]
1−γ
,
which yields :
W
w
M
= W +
γ
2− γ
(a−W ), Q
w
M
=
(1− γ)(a−W )
(2− γ)b
,
Π
w
M
=
1
b
[
(1− γ)(a −W )
(2− γ)
]
2
, U
w
M
=
γ(1− γ)(a−W )
2
(2− γ)
2
b
,
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where the superscript "w" means that the union chooses wage-maximizing delegates.
In the second stage, the union chooses whether to use surplus-maximizing delegates
or wage-maximizing delegates to negotiate the wage with the monopolist. The union
will choose wage-maximizing delegates if and only if U
w
M
≥ U
s
M
, that is, if and only if
8(1 − γ) − (2 − γ)
3
≥ 0. Hence, there is a γ
M
such that the outcome where the union
chooses wage-maximizing delegates is an equilibrium outcome of the stage game if and
only if γ ≤ γ
M
 .76.
5 Incentives for merger
In this section we investigate how the option the union has to use strategic delegation will
affect the incentives for merger. Before answering this question we consider the benchmark
where unions do not have the option of strategic delegation. We say that both firms have
incentives or it is profitable for them to merge if and only if Π
M
≥ Π
1D
+Π
2D
. Without the
option of strategic delegation, both firms are going to merge if and only ifΠ
s
M
≥ Π
ss
1D
+Π
ss
2D
.
Hence, a merger will take place if and only if unions are weak, γ ≤
12−8
√
2
3
 .23. Indeed,
when unions are strong enough, then firms have no incentives to merge because by merging
the wage spillover effects which before were pushing down the wages would disappear.
Proposition 1 If unions cannot use strategic delegation, then firms have incentives to
merge if and only if unions have a weak bargaining power, γ ≤
12−8
√
2
3
.
One would be tempted to conclude that unionization or strong unions will decrease
the incentives for merger. Then, by giving the option of strategic delegation to the union,
one would expect that the profitability of mergers would decrease even more. As we show
next there is no clear answer.
If γ ≤ γ
M
then both under the duopoly and the monopoly situations wage-maximizing
delegates are sent. Firms have incentives to merge if and only if Π
w
M
≥ Π
ww
1D
+Π
ww
2D
. Hence,
a merger will occur if and only if γ ≤
12−8
√
2
9−4
√
2
 .205. This result seems to suggest that
strategic union delegation would reduce incentives for merger. But this is not always true.
If γ ∈ [γ
M
, γ
D
] then a merger enables both firms to switch from a duopolistic equilib-
rium in which wage-maximizing delegates are sent to a monopolistic equilibrium in which
surplus-maximizing delegates are sent. That is, a merger switches the equilibrium regime
with respect to the choice of delegates. Since Π
s
M
≥ Π
ww
1D
+ Π
ww
2D
for γ ∈ [γ
M
, γ
D
], it is
optimal for the firms to merge and negotiate the wage with surplus-maximizing delegates
in order to avoid a duopoly where negotiations would take place with wage-maximizing
delegates.
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Proposition 2 If unions can use strategic delegation, then firms are going to merge if and
only if the union bargaining power is weak, γ ≤
12−8
√
2
9−4
√
2
, or the union bargaining power is
strong but not too strong, γ ∈ [γ
M
, γ
D
].
Finally, one should notice that the option of strategic delegation will harm both the
firms and the unions when γ ∈ [γ
M
, γ
D
]. Indeed, we observe that the equilibrium outcome
with strategic delegation is Pareto-dominated by the one without strategic delegation:
Π
s
M
< Π
ss
1D
+Π
ss
2D
and U
s
M
< U
ss
1D
+U
ss
2D
.
6 Conclusion
To summarize, strategic union delegation will decrease the incentives for merger when the
union bargaining power is weak. However, if the union has a strong bargaining power,
then strategic delegation might create incentives for the firms to merge. In terms of com-
petition policy, one should be careful when drawing conclusions with respect to unions
and incentives for merger. Indeed, an increase in the union bargaining power will tend
to diminish the incentives for merger. But, once we allow for strategic delegation (for
instance, by means of laws protecting union delegates from being dismissed), firms might
be pushed to merge even if unions are strong, because a merger enables them to switch
from bilateral negotiations with wage-maximizing delegates to a single negotiation with
surplus-maximizing delegates. Moreover, they might end up in a situation where both
the firms and the unions are worse off compared to the case without the possibility of
delegation.
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